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Constitution Making and Post Conflict Reconstruction 
Catherine Turner & Ruth Houghton 
Durham Law School 
 
 
Abstract 
It is increasingly recognized in international law and policy that constitutional 
transformation plays a role in post conflict reconstruction. Yet the extent to 
which international law does or should impose a normative framework on post 
conflict constitutional processes remains contested. This chapter addresses this 
issue by exploring the ways in which international law intersects with 
constitutional processes in the post conflict environment. Ultimately the chapter 
highlights the need for closer dialogue between law and politics in this area in 
order to address some of the tensions inherent in trying to restore fractured 
sovereignty through constitutional transformation.  
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Introduction 
 
It is increasingly recognized in international law and policy that constitutional 
transformation plays a role in post conflict reconstruction.1 Over the course of 
the last twenty five years more than 30 constitutions have been either adopted 
or amended in a post conflict context.2 Of these only a relatively small number 
have been drafted under the direct supervision of the United Nations (UN).3 
However while the UN does have clear policy guidelines on the principles that 
                                                        
1 Kirsti Samuels, ‘Post Conflict Peacebuilding and Constitution Making’ (2006) 6 Chicago Journal 
of International Law 663, 664 
2 For details of states who have benefited from United Nations assistance in constitutional 
processes see Vijayashri Sripati, ‘UN Constitutional Assistance Projects in Comprehensive Peace 
Missions: An Inventory 1989-2011’ (2012) 19 International Peacekeeping 93 
3 The Security Council has mandated peace operations to assist only 12 states with writing their 
constitutions. These are Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, East Timor, Nepal, Kosovo and Iraq. See Sripati (n 2) 93 
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should underpin post conflict constitutional processes,4 this is an area of post 
conflict reconstruction in which until recently there has been little direct 
engagement with international law. That is not to say that there has been no 
scholarly engagement with the question of post conflict constitutionalism. A 
number of disparate bodies of literature exist that address the function of the 
constitution in post conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding, many of which 
draw on international law in their analysis.5 Post conflict constitutionalisation 
has been addressed in the literature from the perspective of constitutional 
design6; as an aspect of transitional justice7; and most recently within the 
evolving international law framework of jus post bellum.8 While each of these 
bodies of literature addresses the role of the constitution in post conflict 
reconstruction policy, few address specifically the role played by international 
law in shaping either the process or the outcome of the constitutional process. 
Some highlight the influence of international actors, 9  and the increased 
internationalisation of the process,10 but the extent to which international law 
does or should impose a normative framework on post conflict constitutional 
processes remains contested.11 Indeed the disparate nature of this field makes it 
difficult to identify a single body of rules that could be said to represent an 
                                                        
4 United Nations Guidance Note of the Secretary General, ‘United Nations Assistance to 
Constitution Making Processes’ (April 2009) 
5 See eg Samuels (n1); Philip Dann and Zaid Al-Ali, ‘ The Internationalised “Pouvoir Constitutent”: 
Constitution Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor’ (2006) Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 423; Hallie Ludsin, ‘Peacemaking and Constitution Drafting: A 
Dysfunctional Marriage’ (2011) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 239; 
Emily Hay, ‘International(ized) Constitutions and Peacebuilding’ (2014) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 141 
6  see eg  Choudhury, Sujit, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or 
Accommodation? (OUP, 2008); Harvey, C and A Schwartz (eds) Rights in Divided Societies (Hart, 
2012); Lerner, H, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (CUP, 2011) 
7 Turner, C, ‘Transitional Constitutionalism and the Case of the Arab Spring’ (2015) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (forthcoming); McConnachie K and J Morrison, ‘Constitution 
Making, Transition and the Reconstruction of Society’ in K McEvoy and L McGregor (eds) 
Transitional Justice From Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart, 2008); 
Aeyal M Gross, ‘The Constitution, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South 
Africa and Israel’ (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 47 
8 Bhuta, N ‘New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of Constitutional 
Transformation’ (2012) 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 799; Jennifer S Easterday, ‘Peace 
Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum’ in Carsten Stahn et al (eds) Jus Post Bellum: 
Mapping the Normative Foundations (OUP, 2014) 379 
9 See Dan and Al-Ali (n 5) 
10 See Hay (n 5) 
11 Bhuta (n 8); Easterday (n 8) 
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established normative framework for post conflict constitution making, leaving a 
regulatory gap for those involved in providing post conflict constitutional 
assistance.  
 
This chapter aims to address this gap by exploring the ways in which 
international law intersects with constitutional processes in the post conflict 
environment. This is done with specific reference to the extent to which it could 
be said that international law exerts a normative pull on the process. The chapter 
begins by locating the role of constitution drafting within international law and 
policy. It identifies a shift away from constitution drafting as an aspect of 
development policy towards the incorporation of constitutional reform as an 
element of the peace and security agenda. The chapter then considers the 
increased international attention paid to post conflict constitutional processes by 
the international community, and charts the impact that the increased 
internationalization of these processes has on the eventual outcome. To do this 
the chapter explores the role of international law in providing a normative 
framework for constitutional reform, assessing both the potential and the 
shortfalls of international law as a normative regime in this area. It highlights the 
tension between international involvement and local ownership that punctuates 
debate in this area, and considers the way in which international law should 
engage with questions of sovereignty in these contexts.  The chapter draws on 
the recent case study of the constitutional process in Somalia to illustrate the 
ways in which international law has intersected with constitutional reform in 
that context. As one of the most recent constitutional processes to be conducted 
with United Nations supervision, and spanning over 20 years, the case of Somalia 
is used to narrate shifting international priorities and illustrates the promises 
and pitfalls of international intervention. The chapter therefore uses this case 
study to draw conclusions of more general application for post conflict 
constitutional reform. Ultimately the chapter highlights the need for closer 
dialogue between law and politics in this area in order to address some of the 
tensions inherent in trying to restore fractured sovereignty through 
constitutional transformation.  
 
 4 
 
Post Conflict Constitutional Assistance: Shifting Paradigms 
 
As noted, international involvement in post conflict constitutional processes is 
not a new phenomenon. While often thought of as a post Cold War development, 
UN assistance in statebuilding has a much longer pedigree.12 However on the 
specific question of constitutional assistance, current international policy is 
rooted in the experience of the UN of supporting constitutional processes in 
Cambodia, East Timor and more recently Afghanistan. 13  It has been 
predominantly a practice led field, administered by the UN as a “long term 
conflict prevention strategy underlying development.” 14  Until 2005 such 
assistance had been undertaken under the auspices of the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) on an ad hoc basis, in the absence of an overarching 
doctrine to provide guiding principles.15 In 2005 it was recommended that the 
capacity of the UN to deliver effective assistance when requested depended on it 
developing doctrine and guidance in the area that would allow the provision of 
technical expertise.16 This has been done through documenting the experiences 
of the UN to date and reflecting on that practice, forming part of a broader 
institutional reflection on the UN’s role in assisting countries with the transition 
from war to peace initiated as a result of the Secretary General’s report ‘In 
Larger Freedom’.17  
 
However constitution making processes have also in recent years been identified 
as a central aspect of democratic transitions and peacebuilding.18 The linking of 
constitutional processes with the establishment of peace and security introduced 
a second source of potential international involvement in constitutional 
processes- one much more closely linked with international law. In 2000, 
                                                        
12 Ralph Wilde, ‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial 
Administration’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 583 
13 Michele Brandt, ‘Constitutional Assistance in Post Conflict Countries, The UN Experience: 
Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan’ (UNDP, June 2005) 
14 Sripati (n 2) 93 
15 Guidance Note (n 4) 3 
16 Brandt (n 13) 
17 United Nations Secretary General, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security and 
human rights for all’ (May 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005 
18 Samuels (n 1) 664 
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following a series of high profile failures by the Security Council to prevent 
atrocities, the Secretary General commissioned a report on UN peacekeeping 
operations.19 Central to the recommendations made in this report was an explicit 
emphasis on the importance of the rule of law and the protection of human 
rights to the establishment of peace. This potentially extended the institutional 
scope of constitutional assistance beyond the narrow confines of UNDP and 
towards the much broader remit of the Security Council.20 This report has been 
interpreted as signifying a shift towards greater engagement with ideas of 
democracy and constitutional settlement in international law,21 providing a 
rationale for international intervention in constitutional processes. With this 
shift has come a more explicit engagement with international law in the process 
of post conflict constitution drafting. With the identification of constitutional 
reform as key aspect of peace and security came a shift away from the ‘soft’ 
activity of development, which allows for a much more progressive approach to 
the realization of international law, towards the ‘hard’ business of peace and 
security where compliance with international norms is a matter of legal 
obligation and seen as central to delivering international security.  
 
Locating the Role of International Law 
 
Despite the increased attention paid to constitutional reform within the peace 
and security agenda, there is currently no extant body of international law that 
provides generally applicable rules on post conflict constitutional reform. As 
outlined, this is an area that has been largely practice driven, with policies 
formulated as a result of reflection on practice rather than in response to legally 
mandated requirements. In the post conflict context international law can be 
divided into two distinct categories; the ‘hard’ law that mandates international 
action; and the ‘soft’ law and policy that is used to add substance to international 
interventions. 
                                                        
19 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi) UN Doc A/55/305- 
S/2000/809 paras 10-13 
20 Brahimi (n 19) 
21 White, Nigel, ‘Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The 
Brahimi Report)’ (2001) 6 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 127 
 6 
 
“Hard” Law – The Constitution, Peace and Security 
The first key site of engagement of international law with constitutional reform 
is located in the intervention of the Security Council, acting pursuant to its 
chapter VII powers. The expansion of the definition of peacekeeping to include 
the much broader idea of ‘peacebuilding’ as outlined in the Brahimi report has 
allowed for more intensive intervention in the internal governance of states than 
would traditionally have been allowed under international law. Intervention 
typically now arises as a result of the Security Council authorizing transitional 
peacebuilding measures that include a constitutional process.22 The level of 
detail of these resolutions varies,23 but the common thread is that ‘hard’ 
international law is being used to mandate internationally supervised 
constitutional reform as an integral element of re-establishing security.  
 
Therefore international law, in the form of legally binding Security Council 
resolutions, introduces international law into post conflict constitutional 
processes. However to date, the use of Chapter VII powers has not led to claims 
of the existence of a consolidated or normative body of international law that 
addresses the requirements of post conflict constitution making. ‘Hard’ 
international law has not imposed substantive requirements on such 
constitutional processes. Security Council intervention remains limited to 
requiring that constitutional reform take place, and the holding of free and fair 
elections, linked to established principles of self-determination. Therefore while 
it may be argued that international law now requires some form of constitutional 
reform in post conflict societies, the nature and scope of this reform is not 
specifically addressed. This may be because the divergent contexts in which the 
Security Council votes to use these powers means that it would be difficult to 
distil principles of general application.24 Because each example is bounded by 
the scope of the mandate provided by the resolution, they remain squarely in the 
                                                        
22 The most recent of these, and the one that will form the basis of the analysis presented in this 
chapter, is Resolution 1814 on Somalia. UN Doc S/Res/1814 (2008) para 5 
23 Some, for example Resolution 1272 (2002) established an interim administration for East 
Timor, while Resolution 1814 (2008) set specific timelines for transition in Somalia. 
24 Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Carsten Stahn et al 
(eds) Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford University Press, 2014) 43 
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realm of practice rather than providing indicators of a general legal obligation.25 
It certainly could not yet be argued that a customary law of constitutional 
assistance exists. This is not to say, however, that international law does not 
exert any influence on the substance of post conflict constitutions.26  
 
Security Council resolutions illustrate the way in which the ‘peace and security’ 
paradigm facilitates the involvement of international actors and sets 
benchmarks, such as the adoption of a new constitution. It is this shift that 
provides the context in which the role of international law in constitutional 
processes can be assessed. Framing constitutional reform as an inherent part of 
the wider project of establishing security and the rule of law allows for much 
greater emphasis on compliance with fundamental principles of international 
law within the process. This raises three key issues; first, the way in which 
international law is used to legitimize the involvement of external actors in post 
conflict constitutional processes; second, the ways in which international 
involvement dictates the process and the outcome of constitutional reform; and 
finally the extent to which international law provides a normative framework 
that facilitates or constrains constitutional processes.  
 
International law and external actors 
 
The past thirty years have seen a number of high profile examples of 
international intervention in post conflict reconstruction. The practice of 
international territorial administration has been mandated by the Security 
Council in Cambodia,27 East Timor,28 and Kosovo.29 These resolutions use the 
force of international law to authorize not only the establishment of an 
international administration, to govern the state in question, but also to provide 
a legal basis for the much broader range of policies adopted pursuant to that 
mandate. Therefore the role of international law is clearly visible – it legitimizes 
                                                        
25 Fleck (n 25) 
26 see pages [ ]  
27 UN Doc S/Res/745 (1992) 
28 UN Doc S/Res/1272 (1999) 
29 UN Doc S/Res/1244 (1999) 
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the intervention of external actors in the domestic affairs of otherwise sovereign 
states. This in turn is only possible in legal terms because of the expansion of the 
definition of peacekeeping to include rule of law reform as a means of achieving 
international peace and security, thereby falling within the law making power of 
the Security Council. This paradigm shift has therefore been central to the ability 
of international law to require constitutional processes be undertaken in post 
conflict states. Absent this link there would be no clear legal basis for the 
international community impose requirements relating to post conflict 
constitutional reform.  
 
One of the most recent constitutional processes to be conducted under United 
Nations supervision took place in Somalia, culminating in the adoption of a 
provisional constitution in 2012. This marked the end of more than twenty years 
of UN involvement in state building in Somalia. International involvement in 
Somalia shifted from humanitarianism to state building in 1994 with Security 
Council resolution 897.30 This resolution revised the mandate of the existing 
United Nations [peacekeeping] Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I), shifting from a 
rationale of creating the conditions for the delivery of aid towards a more 
ambitious programme of political transition that would establish democracy and 
reconciliation in Somalia. With this resolution came a significant expansion in 
the scope of the powers authorized by the Security Council.  UNOSOM II was 
authorized to use ‘all means necessary’ to achieve a secure environment 
throughout Somalia. To do this the mission was mandated to assist the Somali 
people with ‘rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through 
achieving national reconciliation so as to recreate a democratic Somali State’.31 
While constitutional reform was not undertaken until much later, the linking of 
governance with peace and security laid the foundation for international concern 
with post conflict constitutionalism.   
 
The most recent process of constitutional reform began in 2006, following 
international peace talks that led to the establishment of the Transitional Federal 
                                                        
30 UN Doc S/Res/897 (1994) 
31 http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm; UNOSOM II was established by 
Security Council resolution 814 (1993) and took over from UNITAF in May 1993.  
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Government32 and the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter.33 While an 
Independent Federal Constitutional Committee (IFCC) had been appointed in 
2006 to work on drafting a new federal constitution, the Transitional 
Government was unable to establish effective authority, 34  and was itself 
implicated in significant abuses of human rights and humanitarian law. By 2007 
the Security Council was still emphasizing the need for a representative process 
and the importance of democratic elections.35  International pressure was 
maintained throughout this time. In 2008 the Security Council once again 
reiterated the importance of moving towards a constitutional democracy in 
Somalia. The preamble to Resolution 1814 welcomed an agreement to prepare a 
timetable for a constitutional process leading to a referendum that was to be 
held in 2009. The resolution further confirmed that UNPOS and the UN country 
team would support the Transitional Federal Institutions ‘with the aim of 
developing a constitution and holding constitutional referendum and free and 
democratic elections.’36 Breakthrough came with the UN brokered Djibouti Peace 
Agreement, signed on 9 June 2008. This agreement resulted in a ceasefire that 
was to bring to an end 18 years of war and crisis in Somalia.37 It also called for 
the international community to help provide adequate resources for the follow 
up from the agreement, and required the establishment of a high level 
committee, chaired by the UN, to be established within 15 days of the date of the 
Agreement. The role of this committee would be to follow up on issues relating 
to political co-operation between the parties and concerns over justice and 
reconciliation. Since 2011 the constitutional process has assumed central 
                                                        
32 The establishment of the Transitional Federal Government was achieved after a period of 
protracted mediation on the part of the international community rather than through local 
elections. See http://www.cfr.org/somalias-transitional-government/p12475 
33 This Transitional Federal Charter replaced the Transitional National Charter that had been 
adopted following peace talks in 2000 but had expired in 2003. This National Charter is 
interpreted by the UN as the first attempt to introduce constitutional governance in Somalia. UN 
Guidebook on the Provisional Constitution of Somalia. 
http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ZGyV-
8QAQxc%3D&tabid=9705&language=en-US  
34 Matthew Saul, ‘From Haiti and Somalia: The Assistance Model and the Paradox of State 
Reconstruction in International Law’ (2009) 11(1) International Community Law 119, 146 
35  UN Doc S/Res/1744  (2007) paras 1 & 2; UN Doc S/Res/1772 (2007) paras 1&5 
36 para 5 
37 http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/080818%20%20Djibout
i%20Agreement.pdf  
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importance in the Somali transition.38 The ‘Roadmap’ to transition agreed 
between Somali leaders and international organisations lays out strict deadlines 
for the drafting and adoption of a draft constitution.39 It can therefore be seen 
how the international community is deeply embedded in the process in Somalia, 
not only through the exercise of international authority through Security Council 
resolutions, but also in the facilitation and ongoing support for implementation 
of the peace agreement. 40 
 
This involvement demonstrates the ways in which international law, most 
significantly Chapter VII resolutions, are used to introduce external actors into 
post conflict constitutional processes and to legitimate their actions. Once the 
Security Council has authorized action under the heading of peace and security, 
deeper involvement by a broader range of external actors becomes possible. In 
this way international law can frame negotiations by setting parameters for 
debate and setting benchmarks against which the process can be judged.41 It is 
inevitable, therefore, that once such actors are involved in the process that it will 
begin to be shaped not only by domestic political concerns and priorities, but 
also by those of the external actors who are party to it. This applies equally 
whether the process is undertaken directly under the auspices of an 
international administration, such as was the case in Bosnia, East Timor, 
Cambodia or Kosovo, for example, or whether international actors are involved 
as mediators, and therefore in a position to shape the outcome of peace 
                                                        
38 S/Res/2067 (2011) prioritizing the drafting of a constitution  
39 http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/110906%20-
%20Initialled%20Roadmap%20(The%20Annex).pdf  
40 This assistance continues with the newly established United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Somalia, established in 2013 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2102 (2013). The mission 
established to ‘provide a framework for a holistic but more targeted UN engagement capable of 
directly supporting the fragile institutions of the new Somali state and facilitating the 
democratization process, including the adoption of Somalia’s draft Constitution and free and fair 
national elections in four years time.’ See 
http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=TUqlSABGCOA%3D&tabid=9705&mid=1
2667&language=en-US  
41 Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria’ (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 297 
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negotiations.42 The latter has become more significant in recent years with the 
rise of the negotiated peace agreement as a means of ending civil wars. Recent 
research suggests that 34% of peace agreements now contain some provision on 
constitutional reform,43 reflecting the increasing tendency of the UN to explicitly 
require constitution drafting as a means of conflict resolution.44 In Somalia, for 
example, Security Council Resolution 1814 specifically mandated constitutional 
reform.45 Similarly peace agreements themselves are now often regarded as 
having constitutional form.46 This means that provisions included as a result of 
international involvement at the negotiation stage will themselves achieve 
constitutional status, at least until such times as a longer, more participatory 
constitutional process is complete. This was also the case in Somalia, where the 
internationally brokered 2004 peace agreement, the Transitional Federal 
Charter, enjoyed the status of constitutional document, pending the outcome of a 
constitutional process, to be completed within two and a half years of the date of 
the Agreement.47 The Charter, despite naming Islamic Sharia as the source of 
legislation within the state,48 clearly reflects international law in terms of rule of 
law and fundamental rights.49 
 
That international involvement at the negotiation stage is reflected in the 
eventual terms of the peace agreement and then the constitution leads to the 
second key site of engagement with international law. 
 
 
 
                                                        
42 For a good example of the ways in which international actors can shape a peace process see 
Visar Morina et al, ‘The Relationship Between International Law and National Law in the Case of 
Kosovo: A Constitutional Perspective’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 274 
43 Easterday  (n 8) 388 
44 Easterday  (n 8) 395 
45 UN Doc S/Res/1814 (2008) 
46 Christine Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status’ (2006) 100 American Journal 
of International Law 373, 392 
47 For an overview of this process see Kirsti Samuels, ‘An Opportunity for Peacebuilding 
Dialogue? Somalia’s constitution making process’ (2010) 21 Accord 86 
48 Provisional Constitution of Somalia, adopted August 1 2012, Art 8, available at 
http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=RkJTOSpoMME= 
49 See Title two of the provisional constitution which sets out a lengthy list of enumerated rights, 
including due process rights, civil liberties and social and economic rights.  
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Towards a substantive model of constitutional reform 
 
Whereas Security Council resolutions can mandate that a constitutional process 
be undertaken, the implementation of these processes is undertaken by 
regulation.50 It is therefore located more squarely in the realms of policy and 
practice than normative law. It is in this implementation phase that the second 
potential source of international law is located. There is now a trend in post 
conflict constitution making whereby constitutional processes, even if not 
directly supervised by the UN, are increasingly framed with reference to 
international law and international norms. This has been described by Hay as the 
‘normative embedding’ of constitutions within international law,51 and it often 
begins implicitly rather than explicitly, with the involvement of international 
actors in the mediation of a peace agreement. This can establish very early in a 
process the parameters for negotiation and the international law framework 
within which post conflict reconstruction will take place.52 As a result of the UN’s 
consolidation of its rule of law work in recent years, it has been suggested that 
there is now a ‘rule of law menu’,53 a selection of institutions that are used in 
state building to create a legitimate state. This metaphorical ‘menu’ is explicitly 
rooted in international law, resting on the four normative pillars of international 
human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law 
and international refugee law. 54  Where international organisations are 
authorized to oversee or facilitate a constitutional process, or even where they 
have been brokered a peace agreement that required constitutional reform, an 
increased emphasis on compliance with international law becomes clearly 
visible.55  
 
                                                        
50  For example in East Timor Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) mandated the 
establishment of an interim administration to oversee the transition to self government, but the 
legal framework for the conduct of the constitutional process was set out in the administrative 
regulation 2001/2, passed by the High Representative of the international community. 
51 Hay (n 5) 145 
52 Hay (n 5); Morina et al (n 42) 
53 Richard Sannerholm, ‘Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post Conflict Societies: 
Beyond the Rule of Law Template’ (2007) 12 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 65, 67 
54 Report of the Secretary General on Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post 
Conflict Societies. UN Doc S/2004/616 
55 Morina et al (n 42) 
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It has been suggested that issues such as human rights, self-determination and 
democracy are all established matters of international concern.56 While it could 
not yet be argued that a specific normative framework of post conflict 
constitutionalism has emerged from international law, it could be argued that it 
at least provides a values-based framework for the development of such a 
regime.57 It has been suggested that international influence in post conflict 
constitutions is no longer simply technical, but that the United Nations ‘pushes 
for particular substantive norms to be included in the constitution.’58 This 
suggestion appears to be borne out in the fact that international treaties are 
often incorporated directly into the constitution of post conflict states.59 Where 
not directly incorporated, every post conflict constitution, whether drafted with 
international assistance or not, will contain some guarantee that the state will 
give effect to internationally recognized human rights.60 As Bowden et al suggest, 
‘international law can shape domestic developments [through] declarations that 
national laws must not violate international human rights norms and standards’, 
or requiring states to sign and ratify international treaties.61  
 
In the case of Somalia this approach is visible in Article 3 of the Somali 
constitution which endorses international law by proclaiming human rights, rule 
of law and general standards of international law as founding principles.62  From 
2008 more significant progress was made on the constitutional process in 
Somalia. In July 2010 a consultation was launched on a draft constitution. By 
2012 the Federal Constitution was adopted, followed by Presidential elections 
that autumn. This marked the achievement of both procedural and substantive 
concerns of the international community in Somalia. Not only had a constitution 
                                                        
56 Hay (n 5) 148 
57 Dan and Al-Ali suggest that international law is increasingly setting standards for and shaping 
domestic constitutional law, most prominently in the area of human rights, but to a growing 
degree also with respect to the domestic systems of government. (n 5) 428 
58 Easterday (n 8) 395 
59 See for example the constitutions of Bosnia, East Timor, and of Kosovo, all of which directly 
incorporate lists of international treaties into the constitutional structure of the state. 
60 Recent examples include the Provisional Constitution of Somalia, Art 3 and the Transitional 
Constitution of the Government of South Sudan, 2011, Art 9 (3) 
61 Brett Bowden, Hilary Charlesworth and Jeremy Farrall, The Role of International Law in 
Rebuilding Societies After Conflict: Great Expectations (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 10 
62 Art 3 
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been adopted, but substantively it clearly embedded substantive provisions of 
international law, particularly international human rights law.  
 
The way in which international law has shaped the constitution can be seen in 
the evolution of the constitutional document from the Transitional Federal 
Charter, adopted in 2004, to the Provisional Constitution, adopted in 2012. The 
Transitional Federal Charter was adopted in 2004 following the IGAD sponsored 
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference.63 The Charter initially enjoyed 
constitutional status, and set out basic provisions on governance but contained 
provision for a constitutional process that was to culminate in the adoption of a 
new constitution within three years.64  To assist this process, a consortium of 
NGOs, donors and international agencies was formed.65 The process was 
facilitated by international organisations, drawing also on the advice of 
international constitutional experts,66 all acting with the authority of the Security 
Council,67 and this international influence is clearly visible in the substantive 
content of the Charter.  The Charter itself declared Islamic Sharia as the primary 
source of legislation in Somalia.68 However it also contained strong provisions on 
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people.69 The 2012 
Constitution, however, reflected a much broader range of rights, reflective of 
current international concerns and the evolving normative expectations of the 
international community.70 Constitutional status is now afforded to rights such 
as environmental rights,71 economic and social rights,72 children’s rights,73 and 
legally enforceable rights in relation to language and culture.74  The constitution 
                                                        
63 See Sally Healy, ‘Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD’s contribution to 
regional security in the Horn of Africa’ (2009) Crisis States Research Centre, Working paper No 
59, 10 for an overview of the involvement of international actors in this process. 
64 Art 71(2) TFC 
65 Samuels (n 47) 
66 Samuels (n 47) 
67 See for example S/Res/1801 (2008) para 9; S/Res/2010 (2011) para 20 
68  Transitional National Charter Art 8 available at  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4795c2d22.html  
69 Transitional National Charter chapter 5 
70 Bowden et al (n 61) 14 
71 Art 25 
72 Art 27. Rights enumerated include a right to clean potable water, a right to healthcare, and a 
right to full social security. 
73 Art 29 
74 Art 31 
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also prohibits female genital mutilation,75 and a human rights commission is 
established to oversee the domestic protection of rights.76  
 
When compared with earlier constitutions drafted under UN supervision, such as 
those for Cambodia in 1992, or East Timor in 2002, the nature of the rights 
included within the constitutional framework has significantly expanded, 
reflecting the increased expectation of the international community. The link 
between international concern and the final text of the Somali constitution is also 
strengthened by the fact that in 2011, under the auspices of the Universal 
Periodic Review Process, the UNHCHR had highlighted the need to address 
monitoring, capacity building and mainstreaming of human rights in Somalia. 
The report had specifically recommended the development of human rights 
compliant legislative and policy frameworks, including at the level of the 
constitution, and the ratification of international human rights treaties.77 
Therefore what we see is that although there is no set body of international law 
that dictates the shape of the constitution, existing bodies of international law, 
such as human rights law, have the capacity to exert a normative influence on 
these processes, at least on paper. The Provisional Constitution of Somalia, as 
adopted, demonstrates the extent to which international actors project a 
template onto failed or post conflict states. The federalized separation of powers, 
combined with the provision for independent commissions,78 and a Bill of 
Rights, 79  reflect what is becoming a standard model of post conflict 
constitutionalism,80 reflecting broader developments in international law in 
which the ‘United Nations has been instrumental in negotiating peace 
agreements that include national human rights institutions.’81 This is also part of 
a broader move towards conditioning international legitimacy on the 
                                                        
75 Art 15 (4) 
76 Art 41 
77 National Report submitted in accordance with para 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights 
Council Resolution 5/1, Somalia, 11 April 2011. UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/11/SOM/1  
78 Chapter 10 
79 Chapter 2 
80 Bell suggests that human rights commissions are part of a typical blueprint for peace 
agreements. Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2000) 
1 
81 Amanda Lee Wetzel, ‘Post Conflict National Human Rights Institutions: Emerging Models from 
Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2006-2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European 
Law 427 
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establishment of constitutional democracy. Where the entrenchment of rights is 
seen as a model for creating rather than reflecting democracy,82 it will be 
necessary to ensure robust oversight procedures to assist with the embedding of 
these norms, particularly in cultures where they are not already established. The 
Somali Constitution itself provides for a series of commissions, including a 
Human Rights Commission,83 and Anti-Corruption Commission,84 and a national 
Independent Electoral Commission.85  
 
“Soft” Law – International Law as a Transformative Framework 
Finally, whereas Security Council resolutions and binding international treaties 
are examples of the ways in which hard law can be used to exert a normative 
influence on the constitutional process, no less significant is the effect of soft law 
on such processes. As outlined, there is no clearly applicable hard law regime 
that dictates the shape of a post conflict constitution. However where hard law, 
particularly Security Council authorization, mandates international actors to play 
a role in constitution drafting, this provides a context within which a much 
broader engagement with international law can occur. Constitutional processes 
that are conducted with the involvement of international actors are much more 
likely to be rooted in a values-based framework of international law, irrespective 
of the status of the relevant law. In these contexts soft law can be used as a 
means of introducing issues onto the constitutional agenda even in the absence 
of international legal obligation.86 For example the Paris Principles on National 
Human Rights Institutions have featured prominently in post conflict 
constitutions since their adoption in 1993 despite being only ‘soft’ law.87 
Therefore what is important is not the status of international law, but its ability 
to project a coherent set of values that can be used to frame the negotiating 
process.  
                                                        
82 For further discussion of this point see Turner (n 7) 
83 Art 111B 
84 Art 111C 
85 Art 111G 
86 For more detailed discussion of soft law and values based frameworks in international law see 
Catherine Turner ‘Human Rights and the Empire of (International) Law’ (2011) Law and 
Inequality 311 
87 UNGA ‘Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles)’ 20 
December 1993 UNGA Res 48/134 
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Therefore it can be seen that despite the absence of a clearly defined law of post 
conflict constitutional assistance, international law provides a potentially rich 
source of guidance. However the existence of international law that can influence 
the constitutional process is not the end of the story. With increased 
internationalization of the process comes significant challenges. These include 
the sequencing of the constitutional process, balancing priorities between 
domestic and international actors, and finally ensuring that international law is 
adhered to rather than being simply window dressing for an ineffective process.  
 
Challenging Normativity- Difficulties in Practice 
 
The Timing of the Constitution: The Chicken and the Egg 
As noted, recent years have seen a shift in international approaches to 
constitutional assistance away from development and towards security. As yet, 
in the absence of any overarching international law framework for the drafting 
of post conflict constitutions, there are no formal or internationally agreed 
benchmarks for assessing the success or otherwise of the outcome of a 
constitutional process. This is an area where the there are conflicting schools of 
thought on when a constitutional process should occur, and what it should 
achieve.  
 
The case of Somalia illustrates an increasing trend whereby the adoption of a 
new constitution is regarded as the end point of a transition. This represents a 
dilemma for policy makers and practitioners along the lines of which comes first, 
peace or the constitution?88 Central to this dilemma is disagreement over 
whether the constitution can itself create peace, or whether peace is required 
before an effective constitutional process can take place. Whereas development 
                                                        
88 In the Somali context see for example the difference of opinion between Burgess who views 
peacebuilding as only starting after the adoption of the 2012 constitution, and Hosington, who 
suggests that discord between key participants in the process should have been addressed before 
the constitution was adtopted. Stephen Burgess, ‘A Lost Cause Recouped: peace enforcement and 
state building in Somalia’ (2013) 34(2) Contemporary Security Policy 302, 307; Matthew 
Hosington, ‘Devolutionary Politics in Somalia: prospects for peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
development’ (2012) Journal of Public and International Affairs 52, 62 
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policy views the constitutional process as a longer term activity to be undertaken 
once peace has been established, more recent Security Council resolutions 
suggest that the constitutional process is regarded as a means of ensuring 
transition. This introduces a tension into the practice of constitutional assistance 
in that the short terms goals of peacebuilding, including the cessation of violence 
and re-establishing the rule of law, do not necessarily sit easily with the longer-
term priorities of development and social transformation. 
 
In policy terms, UNDP advice advocated the separation of constitution drafting 
processes from the negotiation of a peace agreement.89 It was suggested that if a 
constitution was negotiated while conflict is ongoing, or in its immediate 
aftermath, that constitutional principles may be compromised in the desire to 
reach a settlement. 90  Similarly the parties to such negotiation may not 
necessarily be representative of the population as a whole, meaning that further 
negotiation and deliberation on the constitution would be required, as seen in 
Somalia.91 Within the context of UNDP, policy on constitutional assistance 
emphasizes local partnership and capacity building. The commitment to 
nationally led, transparent, participatory and inclusive processes is clearly 
visible within policy documents in this area.92 These features are emphasized not 
simply to demarcate the relative roles and responsibilities of the UN vis a vis 
national actors, but because adherence to these principles can serve broader 
goals such as helping to ensure the legitimacy of the constitution, increasing the 
capacity of the parties to a conflict to engage in dialogue on difficult political 
issues, and ultimately laying the foundations for democratic process. For this 
reason, policy dictates that ‘UN constitutional efforts should be guided by the 
principle of national leadership to every extent possible.’93 In the case of Somalia, 
the aims of the constitutional process were stated to be ‘to unite the republic; to 
lend legitimacy to future political leaderships; and to introduce institutions that 
                                                        
89  Jamal Benomar, ‘Constitution Making and Peace Building: Lessons Learned from the 
Constitution Making Processes of Post Conflict Countries’ (UNDP, 2003).  
90 Benomar (n 89) cites the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an example of a constitution that 
enshrined division rather than contributed to conflict resolution because it was drafted as part of 
peace negotiations. 
91 Samuels (n 47) 
92 Guidance note (n 4) 
93 Brandt (n 13) 
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are representative, responsive and accountable to the people.’94  It is clear, 
therefore, that constitutional processes are intended to serve relatively broad 
goals, including the legitimation of the new government.95 For this reason, it has 
been suggested that ‘the range of issues that need to be debated in a constitution 
are too vast for a peace negotiation’, and that ‘many of these issues are best 
debated at a slower pace in a more inclusive fashion.’96 Introducing constitution 
making as a tool of peacemaking therefore introduces uncertainty surrounding 
the underlying purpose of the constitutional process, as well as on the timing of 
such process.  
 
It increasingly appears that the necessity to end violence is what has driven 
moves towards a more sustained engagement with international law in post 
conflict constitutional processes, and that has created some tension between 
extended participatory processes and shorter term processes that use the 
constitution as a means of ending the conflict.97 With this shift towards 
constitutionalism as a tool to deliver peace comes a trend towards viewing 
constitution making not as a long-term process, but rather as a static marker of 
transition to be achieved within a set timeframe. 98  In this context the 
constitution marks the re-establishment of sovereignty, the point at which 
international intervention ends and the state is reconstructed.99  
 
The peace process in Somalia was dominated by such timetables, deadlines and 
roadmaps towards a drafted and adopted constitution.100 These timelines and 
deadlines that punctuate the transitional process are relatively short. For 
example, the Transitional Federal Charter stated that the constitution drafting 
process was to be completed within two and a half years. The roadmap written 
                                                        
94 Abdihakim Ainte, ‘Somalia: Legitimacy of the Provisional Constitution’ (2014) 25 Accord 60, 61 
95 Samuels (n 47) 
96 Samuels (n 47) 
97 Hallie Ludsin, ‘Peacemaking and Constitution Drafting: A Dysfunctional Marriage’ (2011) 33 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 239 
98 See Turner (n 7) 
99  See Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International 
Statebuilding (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2007) 10 suggesting that the timetable for the drafting 
of the constitution in East Timor was driven by the need to present an exit strategy to the 
Security Council 
100 S/Res/1814 (2008) para 5 
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in 2011 also placed a tight deadline on transition. This Roadmap itself was 
controversial. Somali parliamentarians protested that its provisions had not 
been submitted to parliament for approval, and that the level of external 
oversight of the constitutional process undermined Somalia’s sovereignty.101 Yet 
these timetables and deadlines continued to be dictated by the Security Council, 
which required the completion of ‘transition’ by the specified date of August 
2012.102 Further, while the preamble to Resolution 2036 notes that the deadlines 
set by the roadmap were missed,103 the international community continued to 
nudge the process forward. 104  This preoccupation with an objectively 
identifiable end point of the transition suggests that the adoption of a new 
constitution is viewed as providing that marker- as the moment at which peace 
and security is re-established.  
 
This preoccupation with the constitutional moment as the point at which the 
transition is complete leads to insufficient emphasis being placed on the process 
leading up to the adoption of the constitution. In Somalia the imposition of 
external benchmarks for adoption of the constitution have potentially 
undermined the legitimacy of the provisional constitution. Ainte reports 
perceptions among the Somali population that the process was ‘engineered to hit 
external benchmarks’, and that the process was truncated under pressure from 
international partners to deliver a constitution by the date specified for the end 
of transition.105 Paradoxically this rush to achieve the constitutional moment 
may diminish local trust and ownership of the process,106 as well as undermining 
the longer-term possibilities of a more extended participatory constitutional 
process.107 It has also been suggested that the priority afforded to establishing 
central government ignored potential ongoing threats to peace and security.108 
                                                        
101 See Ainte (n 94) 60 
102 S/Res/1814 (2008) 
103 S/Res/2036 (2012) 
104  See UN Welcomes Agreement on Somalia’s Constitution Making Process, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42308&#.U93XiKBCZSU  
105 Ainte (n 94) 63 
106 Ainte (n 94) 63 
107 This is not only a risk in Somalia. Brandt (n 13) cites UN backed processes in Cambodia and 
East Timor or examples of opportunities to make the process more genuinely participatory 
having been missed because of tight international timelines. 
108 Hosington (n 88) 62 
 21 
 
 This drive towards a ‘constitutional moment’ is also problematic in that it 
suggests a linear approach towards peacebuilding in which the before and after 
of the transition is clear. This can obscure ongoing problems that arise as a result 
of a truncated constitutional process, such as weak local ownership of the 
process, conflict between international and local norms, and the ability of the 
state in question to effectively implement the constitutional provisions. 
 
Competing Priorities – local vs international ownership 
The tension between long and short terms goals of post conflict constitutional 
reform is of interest in that increasingly constitutional priorities are being set by 
external actors, who mandate not only the fact that constitutional reform must 
be undertaken, but also set prescriptive terms that dictate the content of the 
constitution and the time within which it must be adopted. Section two outlined 
the ways in which international law is becoming embedded into constitutional 
processes, notwithstanding the absence of a dedicated body of law on the 
subject. While the ‘normative embedding’ of international law may bring some 
advantages, such as providing an external framework for negotiation, there are 
also limitations to the capacity of international law to effectively regulate 
constitutional processes. The ways in which externally imposed timelines can 
undermine the constitutional process have been discussed. However 
overreliance on international law as providing normative frameworks for the 
substantive drafting of a constitution can also create problems of ownership. The 
move towards viewing constitutional reform as an element of peace and security 
has resulted in much greater emphasis being placed on the substance of the 
constitution.  
 
The involvement of international actors in these processes means that not only 
must the constitution reflect the priorities of national constituencies, but 
increasingly it must also reflect those of the international actors too.109 The 
constitution must reflect international standards of governance and human 
rights protection, attaining the ‘standard of civilisation’ set by the international 
                                                        
109 Dan and Al-Ali (n 5) 
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community.110 The incorporation of international human rights conventions in to 
post conflict constitutional structures may appear to be simply a means of 
ensuring that the newly reconstructed state meets its international obligations. 
However in the post conflict context there is a symbolism to who makes and 
enforces the law,111 and an overreliance on external standards, such as those 
provided by international law, or indeed those implemented as a matter of policy 
by international experts, can lead to tension between local and international 
priorities, particularly where insufficient effort is made to contextualize 
international law.112 This can lead to a perception among the population that 
international law is being given priority over national law. 113  
 
It has been suggested in the Somali context that the legitimacy of the transitional 
institutions was fundamentally challenged as a result of their having been 
‘developed outside Somalia with too much foreign influence’.114 While much 
greater effort has been made to ensure that the constitutional process was 
locally driven in Somalia in comparison with earlier processes,115 the process 
and the resulting draft constitution have not been without controversy. Opinion 
in Somalia is divided in particular on the question of a federalized governance 
structure.  The draft constitution provides for a federalized structure whereby 
power is divided between the state level federal government and regional 
member state governments. It has been suggested that this model does not take 
sufficient account of context.116  The president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh 
Mohammed, elected in 2012, has emphasized the significance of local clan 
                                                        
110 See Zaum (n 99) on this dynamic in East Timor 
111 For further discussion see Catherine Turner, ‘Delivering Lasting Peace, Democracy and 
Human Rights in Transition: The Role of International Law’  (2008) 2 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 126 
112 See Zaum (n 99) 
113 Mohamud Uluso, ‘Provisional Constitution Heightens Tensions in Somalia’ International Policy 
Digest, August 8 2012 
114 Ainte (n 94); Sally Healy, ‘Somalia: Ready to move on?’ Conciliation Resources, February 2013 
115 The Special Representative of the Secretary General described the roadmap as ‘the most 
inclusive process of all the efforts to rebuild Somalia’s governance’, describing the role of the UN 
as merely to ‘facilitate a Somali led process’. Cited in Ainte (n 94) 60 
116 In particular it is also alleged that this model is being imposed notwithstanding the existence 
of a democratically ratified constitution adopted in 1961. Afyare Abdi Elmi, ‘Revisiting the UN 
Controlled Constitution Making Process for Somalia’ E-International Relations, September 2, 
2012; This is consistent with a pattern noted by Bell, whereby constitutional reform is 
undertaken under the auspices of the international community contrary to existing rules on 
constitutional amendment. See Bell (n 46)  
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structures within Somalia. Highlighting the continued existence of the Somali 
state, despite decades of war, he suggests “There was nothing but the traditions, 
cultures and the customary law. These are what the people used in these decades 
and there is a great deal of relevance in Somali traditions even today.’117  This 
can be contrasted with the more westernized federal system being proposed in 
the draft constitution. 
 
It is stated by the UN that the reason for this federalization is to address 
demands for self-governance arising from the regions in response to years of 
overly centralized government.118 Yet opinion in Somalia is divided not only on 
the question of whether federalism is an appropriate structure for Somalia at 
all,119 but also on how it should operate if it were to be introduced.120 Ainte 
suggests that many Somalis ‘see federalism as overly complex, alien and 
potentially divisive, and a threat to the homogeneity of Somalia’s population.’121 
The internationally devised formula for allocating power and representation was 
viewed as taking insufficient account of these local and informal clan based 
power structures, thereby diminishing the role of some groups.122 This is 
pertinent to the constitutional process for two reasons. The first is that 
representation in the constitution drafting process, through membership of the 
IFCC, was linked to this power sharing formula. Groups who were not recognized 
by the proposed federal structure would therefore also be excluded from the 
constitutional negotiations.123 Second, the mandate of the IFCC itself was 
restricted to drafting a federal constitution. This was mandated from the outset, 
following the adoption of the 2004 Charter, and the result of this was that the 
IFCC ‘did not have the opportunity to debate the type of system that would be 
suitable for the context or advance the interests and aspirations of the Somali 
                                                        
117Cited in Healy (n 114) 
118 UN Guidebook (n 33) 13; This assessment is also shared by the newly elected president of 
Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohammed, who suggests that all the rules in place in Somalia served 
only the highly centralized system, at the expense of any law to facilitate the devolution of power 
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119 See eg Elmi (n 116) 
120 Ainte (n 94) 
121 Ainte (n 94) 
122 Laura Hammond, ‘Somalia Rising: things are starting to change for the world’s longest failed 
state’ (2013) 7 Journal of Eastern African Studies 183, 184 
123 Ainte (n 94) 62 
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people….’124 Local ownership of the process was further diminished by the fact 
that the Constituent Assembly that adopted the constitution was not elected,125 
and had very little real power to make amendments to the draft constitution.126 
This lack of representation was further compounded by the fact that a 
referendum on the constitution that had been promised was never held, due to 
security concerns.  
 
These accounts of the shortcomings of the process stand in stark contrast to the 
UN’s own account, which celebrates its inclusivity. Following the adoption of the 
provisional constitution the UN boasted how  “The Constituent Assembly 
embodied the diversity of Somali society around the traditional clan system, and 
ensured inclusiveness by bringing together elders, religious leaders, women, 
youth, business people, intellectuals and the Diaspora,”127 
 
There is a clear tension between the UN’s assessment of the process and the 
assessment of some Somalis over the extent to which it was in fact locally owned. 
This highlights the potential gap between what is regarded by the international 
community as a model constitutional process, and the perceptions of Somalis on 
both the conduct and the outcome of that process. Constitutional processes, 
where mandated by international law, and conducted within that interpretive 
framework, must remain sensitive to context if they are to be successful.128 Even 
where processes appear prima facie to be inclusive, political sensitivities will 
continue to influence how the processes is regarded. While it should be noted 
that there is currently no explicit international law that requires federal 
government, once internationally mandated constitutional processes are 
devolved to the regulatory or policy sphere they are, as noted in Section [ ] , 
                                                        
124  Elmi (n 116) 
125 See The Gawore Principles on the Finalisation and Adoption of the Constitution and the End of 
the Transition’ 24 December 2011 
126 See Somali Roadmap Signatories, ‘Protocol Establishing the Somali National Constituent 
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‘spoilers’. See Ken Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State 
building and the politics of coping’ (2006-2007) 31 International Security 94 
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heavily influenced by the values that underpin international law.129  The way in 
which international actors frame the debate means that international 
preferences in terms of models of governance, including political and economic 
structures, risk becoming enshrined into constitutional documents in post 
conflict states, regardless of whether these models reflect the preferences of the 
indigenous population or not. 130  It cannot therefore be assumed that 
international involvement or the application of international law can act as a 
legitimate arbiter of constitutional issues, or indeed will be accepted as such by 
the population.  
 
The other key site of conflict over the constitution is the extent to which it 
enshrines international priorities in the realm of human rights and rule of law. 
The draft constitution clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance between 
meeting international human rights law obligations, and reflecting the reality of 
Somali culture. There is much less overt criticism of the constitution on these 
grounds than on the question of federalism. However in this case, actions speak 
louder than words, leading to the final challenge for international law in the post 
conflict constitution drafting process.  
 
Constitutional Guarantees as a fig leaf.  
It has become common in post conflict constitutional reform to include long lists 
of international human rights treaties either within the substance of the 
constitution, or annexed to the document. On paper these newly reconstructed 
states appear to be model international subjects, providing guarantees at the 
highest level of domestic compliance with international law. However where the 
constitution marks the culmination of the transition, and the point at which the 
international community ‘exits’, the adoption of the constitution can mark the 
end rather than the beginning of the state’s commitment to the implementation 
of international law.  
 
                                                        
129 See also Easterday (n 8) 384-385 on international law as ‘framing’ debate in these areas. 
130 See for example Lisa Markadian in this volume. 
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In the Somali example, while the constitution does not specifically list 
international human rights conventions to which Somalia must give effect, it 
does contain a catch all provision stating that the Constitution should ‘ recognize 
and enforce all international human rights conventions’ that Somalia was a party 
to.131 This reflects the position whereby constitutions are no longer purely 
domestic instruments, but must take into account their global context.132 
 
Somalia also provides two good examples of the gap between law and practice in 
this area. The first relates to the representation of women. Despite the existence 
of Security Council resolution 1325, which has since 2000 required that women 
be properly represented in peace processes; and the re-iteration of this 
requirement in the Somali context through Security Council resolutions 1772133 
and 1814,134 in 2014 Somalia had only two female cabinet members.135 This 
simply reflects the persistent under representation of women throughout the 
process. Initially the Federal Constitutional Committee had not included any 
women. While this list was subsequently amended to include two women,136 this 
could hardly be said to meet the requirements of Resolution 1325. Yet the 
Security Council have signaled, in resolution 2067 that the transition is complete, 
notwithstanding the ongoing underrepresentation of women.137  
 
On an even more fundamental level, basic security remains an issue for women 
in Somalia,138 hinting at the alarming gap between the legal protection afforded 
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132 Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Perspectives on Post Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime 
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to women by the Somali constitution,139 and the reality on the ground. This gap 
also illustrates the practical limits of international law as a transformative 
framework in post conflict constitutional processes. To date Somalia has not 
ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women (CEDAW), nor have they produced a National Action Plan on the 
implementation of Resolution 1325.140 Given the failure to implement ‘hard’ 
international law requirements in respect of gender equality, it is hardly 
surprising that other ‘softer’ requirements have also not been met. 
 
The Somali constitution requires that a National Human Rights Institution 
should be established.141 This reflects the increasing trend to require that post 
conflict constitutions provide for national implementation and monitoring of 
human rights after the transition is complete. However to date no such 
institution has been created in Somalia, and this issue has come to represent the 
shortcomings of the constitutional process in terms of guaranteeing robust 
compliance with international law.142 This illustrates the disconnect between the 
international community’s expectations of the constitutional undertakings in 
respect of human rights, and the internal domestic reality which is unable to 
fulfill such expectations.  
 
Both of these examples represent attempts to use law to shape a political culture, 
either in terms of the representation of women, or a legal approach to the 
implementation of human rights. And yet these are both inherently political 
activities, which are unlikely to yield significant success in the absence of 
political agreement.143 This demonstrates the limits of the normative pull of 
international law in the realm of post conflict constitutionalism. As the old saying 
goes, you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink. Therefore the 
                                                        
139 For example, Art 3 (4) guarantees the effective participation of women in public life; Art 15(2) 
prohibits any form of violence against women; Art 24(5) prohibits discrimination based on sex at 
work; Art 27 (5) ensures that women get the support they need to realize their socio-economic 
rights  
140 See Aisling Swaine in this volume for more detailed discussion of the role of action plans. 
141 Art 111B 
142 See OHCHR, ‘Stand alone high level interactive dialogue on assistance to Somalia in the field of 
human rights’ 8th January 2014, UN Doc A/HRC/25/45, para 23(g) 
143 See Lerner (n 6) 234 arguing that there are certain questions that have to be assigned to 
politics alone, where law should not intervene.  
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normative requirements of international law that favour constitutional reform as 
a means of ending transition need to balanced against the need for a longer 
participatory process that fosters a political culture of dialogue and ‘listening to 
the other voice’. 144 
 
Conclusion 
 
The shift that has occurred in recent years towards a normative vision of post 
conflict constitutionalism, encompassing not only the redrawing of political 
boundaries within the state, but also the place of the state within the 
international community, has created a tension between the ideals of democracy, 
concerned with allocating power by free and fair election, and constitutionalism, 
concerned with setting the limits within which power can be exercised. While 
the goal of constitutionalisation remains achieving political agreement on the 
exercise of power within the state, an increased emphasis on the legal 
requirements of international law in relation to governance and individual rights 
alters the dynamic of the constitutional process.  It has been suggested that the 
current trend in international law represents ‘much more than a mere migration 
of ideas or a borrowing of concepts.’145 Rather what is happening is that over the 
past twenty years a particular model of constitutional governance has been 
recast as the only legitimate form of governance in international law, and as such 
forms the benchmark against which constitutional processes can be 
measured.146 This means that constitutional legitimacy is driven not by domestic 
concerns, but by the needs of the peace and security agenda. 
However, as has been discussed, while international law may mandate that a 
constitutional process must take place, and provide a normative framework 
within which negotiations take place, ultimately it cannot guarantee the 
legitimacy of the process or the resulting constitution. Nor can it ensure that 
provisions that are committed to paper will be implemented in any meaningful 
way once the constitution is adopted. For these reasons we should be cautious 
about advocating a strongly normative framework of international law to 
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regulate post conflict constitutional processes. While international law may help 
international actors to put pressure on domestic parties to keep a process 
moving forward, and ensure that a constitution is in fact agreed, we must also 
recognize that constitutional processes are inherently political and that space 
must be left for negotiation and for politics if they are ultimately to be successful.  
 
